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LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
ments, investment of reserves, and rental of units owned by the asso-
ciation may be taxed as corporate income." Reserves used for the
improvement or replacement of the common elements might be taxed
as constructive dividends and thus as income for unit owners. 2 Where
condominium marketing focuses on the profit potential for unit pur-
chasers or the units are rented by the management on a pool basis
when not occupied, the seller of the condominium units might also
be involved in the offering of securities within the meaning of the
federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.63 Attention should also
be given to possible application of the state Blue Sky laws."
Paul Lawrence
THE MINI-COMMERCIAL CODE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 3
After years of consideration and debate, the Louisiana legis-
lature in Act 92 adopted, with minor variations,' the Uniform Com-
for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of
interests." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(9) (a) (1974). An organization will be taxed like a
corporation if it more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust. See
Berger at 1007-10; Note, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321, 327-28 (1970).
61. For a general discussion of the subject, see Berger at 1007-10; Brauer, Federal
Income Taxation of the Condominium Management Corporation, 52 TAXES 196 (1974);
Mancuso, Some Aspects of Condominium Development, 34 ALA. LAWYER 45, 58-60
(1973); Note, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321, 327-28 (1970).
62. Brauer, supra note 61, at 201. Complete disclosure of the financial status of
the project is also required.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10) (1970). See Note, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 104, 107 (1974): "The
ramifications of having one's development fall within such a classification are that the
offeror would have to register with the SEC and all his salesmen would have to be
licensed as brokers under the Act, rather than just being real estate salesmen under
the applicable state law."
64. LA. R.S. 51:701-20 (Supp. 1972).
1. E.g., some language of the original UCC provisions was changed to avoid refer-
ence to terms or concepts foreign to Louisiana law. See LA. R.S. 10:1-103, 3-207, 3-305,
3-419 (Supp. 1974) and comments thereto. References to unadopted sections of the
UCC were also omitted. See LA. R.S. 10:1-105, 3-201 (Supp. 1974) and comments
thereto. Some sections were deleted because they were considered either unnecessary
or had not generally been received favorably in other jurisdictions. See LA. R.S. 10:1-
108, 1-209 (Supp. 1974). The Louisiana draftsmen also changed the language used to
define several terms to improve the UCC text. See LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974) and
comments thereto. To conform to LA. CODE CIrv. P. art. 643, alternative payees are
classified as necessary rather than indespensable parties. LA. R.S. 10:3-116 (Supp.
1974). A portion of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106 [hereinafter cited as UCC],
dealing with consequential, special and penal damages was deleted to avoid conflict
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mercial Code provisions on commercial paper.2 The legislature's
adoption of the Commercial Laws not only deprived the NIL of its
last forum of operation3 but also worked some important changes in
the regime governing commercial paper transactions in Louisiana.
In interpreting the new law, the Louisiana courts will be aided
by the experience in other jurisdictions as well as by the comments
of the Louisiana State Law Institute and those prepared by the joint
sponsors of the UCC.4 The potential impact of the new uniform law
in Louisiana has also received attention in previous issues of this
Review.5 The following discussion seeks only to highlight important
changes and to update prior articles.
Negotiability
A good example of the UCC's attempt to settle the conflicts
among the NIL courts while not departing radically from the prior
law can be found in the provisions dealing with the requisites for
negotiability. Although the Commercial Laws retain the general rule
that a negotiable instrument must contain only an unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain in money,' promises designed to protect
collateral or to give additional collateral on demand now clearly do
not affect negotiability.7 Likewise, by broadly validating any acceler-
with LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934, which defines the standard for awarding damages for
breach of contract. To retain the rules contained in LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2277-78 and
2441, dealing with parol evidence, UCC § 1-206 was not adopted. Section 3-118(e) was
altered to preserve the rule of Watkins v. Haydel, 172 La. 826, 135 So. 371 (1931), that
the words "we promise to pay" binds the makers jointly, rather than jointly and
severally (in solido) as under the UCC.
2. LA. R.S. 10:3-101 to -807 (Supp. 1974). In addition to the provisions on commer-
cial paper, articles 4 and 5 of the UCC dealing with bank deposits and collections (LA.
R.S. 10:4-101 to -504 (Supp. 1974)) and litters of credit (LA. R.S. 10:5-101 to -117) were
also adopted. The articles are preceded by a general provisions section. LA. R.S. 10:1-
101 to -209 (Supp. 1974).
3. Mississippi joined the rest of the country in adopting the UCC effective March
31, 1968, leaving Louisiana as the sole state applying the NIL.
4. Introduction to R. HERSBERGEN, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSrrS AND
COLLECTIONS IN LOUISIANA: THE COMMERCIAL LAWS, at iii (1974).
5. For more detailed discussions of the various areas affected by the Commercial
Laws, see The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on
the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana: A Student Symposium, 16 LA. L. REv.
89 (1955); Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 403 (1955); Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 419 (1955).
6. LA. R.S. 10:3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1974). The same requirements under the NIL
were found in LA. R.S. 7:5, 7:6 (1950) (repealed 1974).
7. LA. R.S. 10:3-112(1)(c) (Supp. 1974). Hawkland, Some Observations Concern-
ing Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 228, 246 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Hawkland]; Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 403, 411 (1955).
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ation clause, section 3-109(1)(c) rejects the view of one Louisiana
decision' that an acceleration clause rendered the time of payment
uncertain and the note non-negotiable.I
Consistent with the theme of continuing the general NIL rule
while clarifying troublesome ambiguities is the treatment accorded
by the Commercial Laws to the sum certain requisite for negotiabil-
ity. Without derogating from the demand that a negotiable instru-
ment be payable for a sum certain,'" the 1974 law allows the parties
to provide for a discount for early payment without thereby rendering
the sum uncertain." The provision, clearly a recognition of commer-
cial necessity, is bottomed on the notion that, although a discount
clause may prevent prediction with mathematical exactitude of the
sum that eventually will be paid, the discount rate used by bankers
is based on enough of a "commercial certainty" not to destroy negoti-
ability.
While the NIL used the words "fixed or determinable future
time" to specify when an instrument must be payable to be negotia-
ble, 2 the Commercial Laws require that the note be payable at a
"definite time."'" The increased specificity apparently demanded by
the new language is affirmed by section 3-109(2) which precludes
predicating payment upon the happening of an event "uncertain as
to time of occurance." The chief significance of this change will be
to render notes payable after the expiration of a certain period follow-
ing the death of a specified person non-negotiable, reversing the NIL
rule imputing negotiability to such "post-obituary notes." However,
the intended result of the change is somewhat diluted by the valida-
tion of acceleration clauses; the prohibition can be easily avoided by
providing for acceleration of a long-term note upon the death of an
individual. "
While it is still true that a negotiable instrument must contain
an unconditional promise to pay money," the Commercial Laws' defi-
8. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 132 La. 532, 61 So. 561 (1913). Contra,
Merchants & Marine Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 16 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. La.
1936); Mechanics & Metals Nat'l Bank v. Warner, 145 La. 1022, 83 So. 228 (1919).
9. See Hawkland at 240, 246; Comment, 15 LA. L. REV. 403, 415 (1955). LA. R.S.
10:3-109(1)(d) (Supp. 1974) provides also that an instrument is payable at a definite
time if it is payable "at a definite time subject to extension at the option of the holder,
or to extension to a further definite time at the option of the maker.
10. LA. R.S. 7:1 (1950) (repealed 1974).
11. LA. R.S. 10:3-106 (Supp. 1974).
12. LA. R.S. 7:1(3) (1950) (repealed 1974).
13. LA. R.S. 10:3-104(1)(c) (Supp. 1974).
14. Hawkland at 241-42.
15. LA. R.S. 10:3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1974). The same requirement under the NIL
was found in LA. R.S. 7:1(2) (1950) (repealed 1974).
19751
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
nition of an unconditional promise'" differs somewhat from that for-
mulated in the NIL jurisprudence. A promise to pay out of a particu-
lar fund no longer renders the promise conditional "if the instrument
is issued by a government or governmental agency or unit."'" The
"particular fund" doctrine of the NIL is further modified by section
3-105(1)(h) which provides that a promise to pay out of the assets of
a partnership is not conditional even if the partners are not individu-
ally liable on the instrument.
Louisiana was among the minority of jurisdictions under the NIL
following the "single sentence" doctrine, adopted by our courts in
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Publishing Co.'" and Tyler
v. Whitney-Central Trust & Savings Bank.'" In the Times case, the
court held that the words "as per contract" appearing in the same
sentence as the promise rendered the instrument non-negotiable on
the premise that these words conditioned the promise on the terms
of the contract; in Tyler, on the other hand, similar words in a sent-
ence separate from the promise were found neither to condition the
promise nor to destroy negotiability. Section 3-105 clearly abandons
as a criterion for negotiability the positioning of reference to extra-
neous agreements and adopts the NIL majority rule which substi-
tutes as the controlling factor the use of particular terms; if the in-
strument states that it is "subject to" or "governed by" another
agreement, the promise to pay is conditional while the words "as per
contract," regardless of their placement, will not cause the promise
to be conditional. Thus, not only are Tyler and Times overruled, but
the holding of Newman v. Schwarz ° that the words "note subject to
terms of lease" did not render the note non-negotiable is reversed by
the Commercial Laws.2 '
Holder in Due Course
The question whether a holder is a holder in due course is a
pivotal determination under the Commercial Laws, as it was under
the NIL. 22 While the requisites for achieving holder in due course
16. LA. R.S. 10:3-105 (Supp. 1974).
17. LA. R.S. 10:3-105(1)(g) (Supp. 1974); Hawkland at 238-40. Comment, 15 LA.
L. REv. 403, 409 (1955). Notations for convenience neither limit the promise to a
particular fund nor render the promise conditional. See LA. R.S. 10:3-105 (1)(f) (Supp.
1974).
18. 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612 (1917).
19. 157 La. 249, 102 So. 325 (1924).
20. 180 La. 153, 156 So. 206 (1934).
21. Hawkland at 232-34; Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 403, 409 (1955).
22. The primary effect of holder in due course status is the cutting off of all claims
and defenses except those specifically set forth in LA. R.S. 10:3-305 (Supp. 1974).
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status remain basically unchanged, some differences are noteworthy.
For instance, the mere fact that an instrument is not complete and
regular on its face no longer in itself prevents the holder from being
a holder in due course. Rather, the defects must be such as to put
him on notice of defenses before he will be deprived of the status.3
Additionally, that the instrument is overdue will not automatically
prevent its holder from being a holder in due course, as was the case
under the NIL. He must have notice of the overdueness to be dis-
qualified."
The apparent shift of the Commercial Laws toward a more
subjective standard in these two instances is offset by the infusion of
a more objective content into the general concept of notice." Thus,
in contrast to the actual knowledge-bad faith standard of the NIL,
section 3-304 details circumstances when the purchaser will be
deemed to have notice of overdueness, claims, or defenses."
The longstanding conflict as to whether a payee can be a
holder in due course is resolved by section 3-302 of the Commercial
Laws; the payee can achieve the status if he meets the normal requi-
sites. The significance of this clarification will be limited because in
most instances the payee will have notice of any defenses the maker
has and would not qualify as a holder in due course. 8 Moreover, if
there are no assertable defenses, holder in due course status offers no
advantage to a payee, who is already a holder, except to require of
him a less demanding presentment and transfer warranty regarding
material alteration and the validity of the signature of the drawer or
maker. 9
Although a party must still give "value" in order to be a holder
23. LA. R.S. 10:3-302(1)(c), 3-304(1)(a) (Supp. 1974); Comment, 15 LA. L. REv.
419, 420 (1955). See LA. R.S. 7:52(1) (1950) (repealed 1974).
24. LA. R.S. 7:52(2) (1950) (repealed 1974).
25. LA. R.S. 10:3-302(1)(c) (Supp. 1974); Comment, 15 LA. L. REy. 419, 427 (1955).
26. Comment, 15 LA. L. REV. 419, 424 (1955).
27. LA. R.S. 10:3-304 (Supp. 1974) sets out instances in which the facts are such
that the purchaser will not be heard to say he was without notice. This approach, along
with § 3-304(3) whereby "reason to know" of certain facts amounts to notice, and the
general definition of notice in § 1-201 indicate that notice introduces an element of
objectivity into the two prong test of § 3-202, i.e., good faith and notice. The subjective
standard of good faith is nevertheless retained.
28. One narrow situation in which this change will have an impact is where A
fraudulently induces the maker to sign and deliver an instrument payable to P, and P
pays A for it in good faith and without notice of the fraud. In such a case, P would be
a holder in due course. LA. R.S. 10:3-302(2) (Supp. 1974) & comment 2(D); Comment,
15 LA. L. REv. 419, 431 (1955).
29. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1974).
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in due course, 30 the Commercial Laws revise somewhat the meaning
of "value." The NIL rule" that a collecting bank giving provisional
credit for a negotiable instrument has not given "value" is retained
and extended by the Commercial Laws so that any executory promise
to give value is not itself "value" except when a holder "gives a
negotiable instrument or makes an irrevocable commitment to a
third person. 32 As explained by the comments to section 3-303(c),
the reason for this change is that a purchaser discovering defenses or
defects in his transferor's title can rescind the transaction for breach
of the 3-417 warranties without loss to himself if the only considera-
tion he has given is an executory promise. Thus, the prime advantage
of holder in due course status-cutting off defenses and claims-is no
longer necessary.
Transfer and Negotiation
A major change wrought by the Commercial Laws is the reversal
of the "once bearer paper-always bearer paper" rule. The NIL pro-
vided that an instrument was bearer paper if the only or last indorse-
ment was in blank33 and that even if a bearer instrument was indorsed
specially, it could nonetheless be further negotiated by delivery."
Under the Commercial Laws, a specially indorsed instrument may be
further negotiated only by indorsement of the special indorsee even
if the instrument was at one time bearer paper.35 Now, an instrument
payable to order but indorsed in blank becomes bearer paper until
specially indorsed again, thus establishing the maxim that the last
indorsement controls the character of the paper.
Liability of Parties
When a negotiable instrument has been materially altered at
some point between issuance and presentment, the attendant loss
must be borne either by a party liable on the instrument or by the
holder seeking to enforce the promise to pay. Under the NIL, a holder
who was not a holder in due course could not enforce a materially
altered instrument against any party liable thereon who did not as-
sent to the alteration." Under the Commercial Laws, a party is dis-
30. LA. R.S. 10:3-302(1)(a) (Supp. 1974).
31. LA. R.S. 7:54 (1950) (repealed 1974).
32. LA. R.S. 10:3-303 (Supp. 1974); Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 419, 429 (1955).
33. LA. R.S. 7:9(5) (1950) (repealed 1974).
34. LA. R.S. 7:40 (1950) (repealed 1974).
35. LA. R.S. 10:3-204 (Supp. 1974); Hawkland at 242-43.
36. LA. R.S. 7:124 (1950) (repealed 1974).
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charged only if the alteration, made by the holder, is fraudulent and
changes the party's contract. 7 Otherwise, the holder may enforce the
instrument according to its original tenor.38
A holder in due course, on the other hand, is afforded greater
protection under both commercial paper regimes. He may always
enforce a materially altered instrument according to its original
tenor, 9 and section 3-406 retains the Young v. Grote"0 rule that a
holder in due course may even enforce an instrument as altered if the
obligor's negligence was a factor substantially contributing to the
alteration.
According to the NIL, the unauthorized completion and delivery
of an instrument was a real defense, assertable against a holder in due
course," although neither unauthorized completion nor unauthorized
delivery alone was more than a personal defense."2 In recognition that
the holder in due course is in the same position whether only one of
these events takes place or they concur,"3 the Commercial Laws re-
duce unauthorized completion and delivery to a personal defense.4
In the "imposter" and "fictitious payee" situations, both the
NIL and the Commercial Laws protect the good faith purchaser by
placing the risk of loss on the drawer or maker. Under the NIL, a
fictitious payee instrument was deemed bearer paper, thereby mak-
ing the payee's indorsement irrelevent, if the drawer or maker had
actual or imputed knowledge that the named payee was fictitious.45
In the "imposter" situation, although the drawer or maker had no
knowledge that the named payee was not the party with whom he was
dealing, the holder was protected under NIL jurisprudence by deem-
37. LA. R.S. 10:3-407(2) (Supp. 1974). The Commercial Laws erect a much more
difficult burden of proof than did the NIL to avoid an altered instrument. See People's
Bank & Trust Co. v. Thibodeaux, 172 La. 306, 134 So. 100 (1931) (discharging maker
where it could not be determined who had altered the instrument); Simmons v. Green,
138 So. 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (allowing instrument to be avoided where changes
were made in good faith). See generally Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 105 (1955).
38. LA. R.S. 10:3-407(3) (Supp. 1974); LA. R.S. 7:124 (1950) (repealed 1974).
39. LA. R.S. 10:3-407 (Supp. 1974); LA. R.S. 7:124 (1950) (repealed 1974).
40. 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827). See generally Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 134
(1955).
41. LA. R.S. 7:15 (1950) (repealed 1974).
42. LA. R.S. 7:14, 7:16 (1950) (repealed 1974).
43. Hawkland at 243-44; Comment, 15 LA. L. REv. 419, 433 (1955).
44. LA. R.S. 10:3-115, 3-407(3) (Supp. 1974).
45. LA. R.S. 7:9(3) (1950) (repealed 1974). Knowledge of an agent or employee
that the payee was fictitious was imputed to the drawer or maker. The drawer was
presumed to have intended to pay a party other than the named payee. Hawkland at
244-45; Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 115, 117 (1955).
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ing it the intent of the drawer or maker to deal with the party stand-
ing before him; thus, title passed to the imposter and his indorsement
was valid to negotiate the instrument." Under the Commercial Laws,
an indorsement in the name of a named payee by any person is
effective to negotiate either type of instrument, 7 thus reaching the
same result as did the NIL without resorting to the "bearer paper"
or "intent to deal" fictions. This new legal construct also allows the
protection afforded in imposter situations to be extended to induce-
ments through the mail and other non-armslength situations. 8
The transfer warranties imposed by section 3-417(2) are very
similar to those under NIL sections 65 and 66 except that the indor-
ser's warranty now clearly extends beyond his immediate transferee
to all subsequent holders."9 In addition, the Commercial Laws, unlike
the NIL, clearly impose upon one transfering an instrument for con-
sideration the obligation to warrant that no defense of any party is
good against him.50 However, the warranty is limited to one of lack
of knowledge of any defenses if the indorsement is without recourse."
Section 3-417(1) outlines the newly created presentment warran-
ties given by the one who obtains payment or acceptance and by all
prior transferors to any party who pays or accepts in good faith. The
presentment warranties are less inclusive than those given under 3-
417(2) to transferees" because the limitations of Price v. Neal53 are
embodied in section 3-417(1). Under the Price rule, a drawee who has
paid an instrument bearing a forged signature of the drawer may not
recover since drawees are held to know their customers' signatures.
This rule does not apply, however, when the instrument bears a
forged necessary indorsement, for although the party obtaining pay-
ment or acceptance may be in good faith and payment to him is
therefore final, he has breached the 3-417(1) warranty of good title
to the instrument.
46. Comment, 16 LA. L. REV. 115, 117 (1955).
47. LA. R.S. 10:3-405 (Supp. 1974).
48. LA. R.S. 10:3-405(a) (Supp. 1974).
49. L . R.S. 7:65 (1950) (repealed 1974) limited a qualified indorser's warranty to
his immediate transferree and LA. R.S. 7:66 (1950) (repealed 1974) stated that the
warranty given by general indorsers extended only to subsequent holders in due course.
The Commercial Laws extend the warranty of all indorsers to all subsequent holders.
50. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(2)(d) (Supp. 1974).
51. LA. R.S. 10:3-417(3) (Supp. 1974).
52. The transfer warranties of 3-417(2) do not extend to payors, as payors are not
considered transferees. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 15-5
(1972).




The pre-Commercial Laws decisions of Louisiana courts in
Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co.5 and M. Feitel House Wreck-
ing Co. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.55 fashioned circuity of actions
rules designating the channels to be followed by the parties in suing
one another to apportion losses suffered when an instrument is stolen.
Under these cases, the payee of an instrument from whom possession
had been wrongfully acquired and whose indorsement had been
forged could maintain an action only against the drawer on the un-
derlying obligation." The drawer could then recover from the drawee
because the latter had paid an instrument with a forged indorsement
which was therefore not "properly payable."57 Although the NIL
transfer warranties58 enjoyed by holders were not available to any of
the banks in the collection process since the absence of the indorse-
ment of the true owner prevented them from being holders,59 the
drawee could recover from any of the intermediary collecting banks
on the express warranty common to the bank collection process that
"all indorsements [are] guaranteed." Collecting banks, in turn, had
a similar right against the depositary bank, and the depositary bank
would be left to the normal rights of action incident to the depositary
bank-depositor relationship. 0
This circuitous process is abolished by section 3-419, which al-
lows the payee or other true owner to directly sue the drawee bank
or any other person who "pays" such an instrument."' The drawee can
54. 255 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
55. 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925).
56. The issuance of the instrument operates as conditional payment only. If the
instrument is stolen from the payee, the underlying obligation still exists because the
payee "has never in reality been paid." Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 255 So.
2d 816, 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
57. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:4-401 (Supp. 1974).
58. LA. R.S. 7:65, 7:66 (1950) (repealed 1974).
59. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Vucci, 224 La. 124, 130, 68 So. 2d 781, 783 (1953).
60. Since under the Vucci case the depositary bank could not be a holder in due
course of an item bearing a forged indorsement (LA. R.S. 7:65, 7:66 (1950) (repealed
1974)), its right to recover must be based on some theory other than breach of war-
ranty, e.g., recovery of money paid under mistake of fact. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2301,
discussed in Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 255 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971).
61. While the Commercial Laws now allow a direct action, it is still possible to
use the Smith approach based on the underlying obligation. In fact, the Commercial
Laws strengthen the validity of the approach since the completion of the circuit of
action that places the loss on the party who dealt with the thief no longer depends on
the express warranty usually given but not required. This approach may appeal in
some cases where the drawer is in the same locality as the true owner and the drawee
19751
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then recover on the basis of the presentment warranties of section 3-
417(1) or 4-207(1). Under the Commercial Laws as interpreted,"2 a
drawer may not sue a depositary or other collecting bank, however,
as such banks are not in the position to assert defenses of negligence
as is the drawee.63 Section 3-419(3) also purports to shield collecting
and depositary banks from suit by the true owner except to the extent
that such banks have proceeds remaining in their hands. In Cooper
v. Union Bank," the California supreme court nonetheless -side-
stepped the apparent protection of 3-419(3) by reasoning that when
the true owner sues the collecting bank he ratifies the collection of
proceeds from the payor bank. Then, under general banking theory,
the funds paid to the unauthorized party by the collecting bank are
its own, and it holds the proceeds of the instrument for the benefit
of the true owner; therefore, the bank still has the proceeds on hand
and is not shielded by 3-419(3). Applying the same rationale to a
depositary bank takes the final step of allowing the true owner to sue
directly the party most likely to be held ultimately liable, a result
which has much to commend it."
Stephen W. Glusman
or depositary bank is in another forum some distance away. Also, since the rule of Price
v. Neal does not apply in the case of a forged necessary indorsement (see text at note
53 supra), the Smith approach may still validly be used by the drawee under the new
law.
62. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1,
184 N.E.2d 358 (1962). But see Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1 (2d Dist. 1969).
63. The drawee bank is in a better position to discover and prove the negligence
of the drawer because it can prove when cancelled checks were sent to the drawer in a
case where the drawer's alleged negligence is failure to examine and report the forgery.
Moreover, the drawee, having dealt with its customer and being in the same com-
munity, can better discover any faulty business practices of the drawer.
64. 107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 507 P.2d 609 (1973).
65. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 15-4 (1972).
[Vol. 35
